A zero-knowledge proof allows a prover to convince a verifier of an assertion without revealing any further information beyond the fact that the assertion is true. Secure multiparty computation allows n mutually suspicious players to jointly compute a function of their local inputs without revealing to any t corrupted players additional information beyond the output of the function. We present a new general connection between these two fundamental notions. Specifically, we present a general construction of a zero-knowledge proof for an NP relation R(x, w), which makes only a black-box use of any secure protocol for a related multiparty functionality f . The latter protocol is required only to be secure against a small number of "honest but curious" players. We also present a variant of the basic construction that can leverage security against a large number of malicious players to obtain better efficiency. As an application, one can translate previous results on the efficiency of secure multiparty computation to the domain of zero-knowledge, improving over previous constructions of efficient zero-knowledge proofs. In particular, if verifying R on a witness of length m can be done by a circuit C of size s, and assuming that one-way functions exist, we get the following types of zero-knowledge proof protocols: (1) Approaching the witness length. If C has constant depth over ∧, ∨, ⊕, ¬ gates of unbounded fan-in, we get a zero-knowledge proof protocol with communication complexity m · poly(k) · polylog(s), where k is a security parameter.
beyond the fact that the statement is true. A more general problem is that of secure multiparty computation (MPC) [54, 21, 3, 8] . An MPC protocol allows n players to compute a function of their inputs (also referred to as an "n-party functionality") while maintaining the privacy of their inputs and the correctness of the output. A bit more precisely, the protocol should prevent an adversary which may corrupt at most t players from achieving more than it could have achieved by attacking an idealized protocol in which the function is computed by an external trusted party. In particular, corrupted players should not learn further information about the remaining inputs beyond the output of the function. Zero-knowledge protocols can be viewed as a special case of secure two-party computation, where the function verifies the validity of a witness held by the prover.
Honest versus dishonest majority. MPC protocols can be divided into two categories: ones that rely on the existence of an honest majority (namely, assume that t < n/2) [3, 8, 48] and ones that can offer security even when there is no honest majority [54, 21, 17] . In the case of an honest majority, it is possible to obtain "information-theoretic" security that holds unconditionally, whereas in the case of no honest majority, one needs to settle for computational security that holds under cryptographic assumptions. On the other hand, the honest majority assumption is often too strong and is meaningless in the important two-party case.
Constructions of these two types of protocols differ vastly in the types of techniques they employ. While protocols from the second category (most notably, zeroknowledge protocols) have occasionally proved useful for the design of protocols from the first category, we are not aware of applications that go in the other direction. This work is motivated in part by the hope of leveraging the efficiency and simplicity of MPC with honest majority (as well as the large body of relevant work) for the design of efficient protocols in the case of no honest majority, and in particular for the design of efficient zero-knowledge protocols.
Semihonest versus malicious players. Another major distinction is between MPC protocols that offer security against semihonest (i.e., "honest but curious") players, who follow the protocol's instructions but may try to gain additional information from what they see, and protocols that offer security against malicious players, who may arbitrarily deviate from the protocol's instructions in order to compromise the privacy of the inputs or the correctness of the output. We refer to these two types of protocols as being secure in the semihonest model and the malicious model, respectively. Security in the semihonest model is typically much easier to realize than security in the malicious model. Remarkably, the celebrated result of Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson [20, 21] shows how to compile an arbitrary MPC protocol Π which securely computes a function f in the semihonest model into a protocol Π which securely computes f in the malicious model. The high level technique, known as the "GMW paradigm," is to require players to validate every message they send by supplying a zero-knowledge proof that the message is consistent with protocol's Π specification. To implement the zero-knowledge proofs, the compiler needs to look into the code 1 of Π rather than use it as a black-box, and the resulting protocol Π needs to perform multiple cryptographic operations for every gate in the circuit implementing Π. Thus, applying the GMW paradigm may involve a considerable efficiency n 2 . Using O(kn 2 ) repetitions, the soundness error can be decreased to 2 −k . The black-box nature of our transformation suggests the possibility of significantly better efficiency. In particular, the communication complexity of the resulting zeroknowledge protocols can be smaller than the computational complexity of the MPC protocols from which they are derived. This should be contrasted with traditional zero-knowledge proofs (obtained via a Karp reduction to some fixed NP-complete problem) whose communication complexity is typically much bigger than the computational complexity of the relation R.
Towards obtaining more efficient variants of the construction which avoid the cost of soundness amplification via repetition, we employ MPC protocols that tolerate a larger number of corruptions and allow the verifier to open many views at once. In this case, security of Π f against semihonest players does not suffice, and we need to rely on MPC protocols that have some form of robustness against t malicious players (where typically t will be a constant multiple of the soundness parameter k, and n a ISHAI, KUSHILEVITZ, OSTROVSKY, AND SAHAI
constant multiple of t).
The intuition behind this modification is that it will allow the verifier to obtain t views, rather than just two views, from a single execution of the protocol. Security against t malicious players guarantees that in order to violate the correctness of the MPC protocol Π f (or the soundness of the zero-knowledge protocol) the inconsistencies between the views must be "well spread" in such a way that opening t random views reveals an inconsistency with overwhelming probability. Note that security against t semihonest players does not suffice here. Indeed, in this case a single malicious player can cause all other players to have an incorrect output; if this particular player is not picked by the verifier, no inconsistency is revealed and still the output may be incorrect. On the other hand, we do not need full security against malicious players: it suffices for the protocol to be correct in the presence of malicious players, whereas its privacy is required to hold, as before, only against semihonest players.
Another extension of the basic construction that is needed for our applications is to the "statistical" case where Π f may produce an incorrect output with negligible probability. This case makes even the simple basic construction fail, as it allows the adversary to cheat by biasing the randomness used for generating the views (but otherwise behaving according to the protocol). We show how to overcome this obstacle using standard cryptographic techniques, though for the efficient version of our construction this involves some additional complications.
Applications.
To demonstrate the usefulness of our general approach, we translate previous results on the efficiency of MPC to the domain of zero-knowledge, improving over some previous constructions of efficient zero-knowledge protocols. In particular, if verifying R(x, ·) on a witness w of length m can be done by a circuit C of size s, we get the following types of zero-knowledge proof protocols.
Simple zero-knowledge. By plugging in standard MPC protocols for the semihonest model, such as the 2-private 3-player GMW protocol [21, 17] (which relies on OT channels) or the 1-private 3-player protocol of Ben-Or, Goldwasser, and Wigderson [3] (the "BGW protocol"), we get simple zero-knowledge protocols with complexity O(ks). (Here and in the following, k denotes a security parameter, and the soundness error is at most 2 −k .) These protocols provide more efficient alternatives to the classical zero-knowledge protocols based on 3-colorability or Hamiltonicity, since they apply directly to the circuit representation and do not require a Karp reduction to these NP-complete problems. In contrast to the classical protocols, zero-knowledge protocols derived from the BGW protocol can be efficiently extended to prove relations defined by arithmetic circuits, without requiring us to emulate arithmetic computations via Boolean operations.
Approaching the witness length. If C has constant depth over ∧, ∨, ⊕, ¬ gates of unbounded fan-in, we get a zero-knowledge proof protocol with m · poly(k) · polylog(s) bits of communication. This protocol can be implemented using a oneway function.
3 Alternatively, our technique yields a zero-knowledge proof system in a noninteractive model with preprocessing. The complexity of our protocols is comparable to that of a previous protocol of Kalai and Raz [34] . The latter, however, yields only zero-knowledge argument systems and relies on stronger assumptions, but requires less communication for implementing the setup. Our zero-knowledge protocols, described above, rely on an MPC protocol from [1] , whose basic version combines the BGW protocol [3] with the polynomial representation techniques of [49, 53] . We note that the protocols we obtain are essentially the best one could hope for in terms of both the underlying assumption (one-way functions) and the communication complexity. Indeed, the existence of nontrivial zero-knowledge proofs implies the existence of "nonuniform" one-way functions [45] , and a lower communication complexity for zero-knowledge proofs (as opposed to arguments [37] ) would imply surprisingly efficient probabilistic algorithms for satisfiability [19] .
"Constant-rate" zero-knowledge. Assuming that one-way functions exist, we get a zero-knowledge proof protocol for an arbitrary circuit C of size s and bounded fan-in with communication complexity O(s) + poly(k, log s). Thus, for large circuits, the ratio between the communication complexity and the circuit size approaches a constant. This improves over the O(ks) complexity of the best previous protocols (e.g., [10] ). Our zero-knowledge protocol relies on an MPC protocol from [13] , optimized to work over constant-size fields using secret sharing based on algebraic-geometric codes [9] .
Perspective. Our construction has direct relevance to the two motivating goals discussed above. First, it establishes a new general connection between zero-knowledge and MPC, which in particular allows us to exploit the large body of work on MPC with honest majority for the design of zero-knowledge proofs. The latter, in turn, can be used for the design of general secure two-party protocols and MPC with no honest majority. This new connection also establishes a link between some remaining open questions concerning the efficiency of zero-knowledge proofs and similar open questions in the area of MPC. For instance, if all circuits can be securely evaluated with communication complexity that depends (say) quadratically on the input size, then all NP-relations have zero-knowledge proofs whose communication complexity is roughly quadratic in the witness size.
Second, our construction shows a useful class of applications for which security in the semihonest model can be boosted in a black-box way into security in the malicious model. It is instructive to note that it is generally impossible to directly construct a protocol Π which securely computes a function R in the malicious model by making a black-box use of a protocol Π which securely computes R in the semihonest model. For instance, if R is a zero-knowledge functionality, in the semihonest model we can consider a trivial protocol Π in which the prover simply sends to the verifier the output of R on its input (x, w). Clearly, Π is generally useless for the construction of Π . By modifying R into a related multiparty functionality f , we avoid this impossibility. 
Related work.
Black-box reductions. A rich body of work, initiated by the seminal paper of Impagliazzo and Rudich [30] , attempts to draw the lines between possibility and impossibility of black-box reductions in cryptography. In particular, black-box constructions of MPC protocols from various cryptographic primitives have been previously suggested [36, 41, 38, 12, 31, 26] . Our work differs from all this work in that it treats as a black-box not only the underlying cryptographic primitives but also the func-tionality that should be realized. In contrast, previous constructions address either the case of some fixed functionality or alternatively make a non-black-box use of the functionality.
Efficiency of zero-knowledge. There has been a vast body of work on improving the efficiency of interactive and noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs; e.g., see [5, 10, 39, 40, 11, 6, 25, 34] and the references therein. It is important to note in this context that by settling for computational soundness, one can get asymptotically very efficient zero-knowledge argument systems with a polylogarithmic communication complexity. These argument systems can be either interactive and based on collision-resistant hash functions [37] or noninteractive in the random oracle model [43] . Our focus on proofs rather than arguments is motivated both from a theoretical and from a practical point of view. From a theoretical point of view, we get a stronger notion of soundness under weaker assumptions. From a more practical point of view, the probabilistically checkable proof (PCP)-based constructions of arguments, as in [37, 43] , are still quite far from being efficient in practice. Finally, our results are independently motivated by the general goal of boosting security against semihonest players into security against malicious players in a black-box way. This motivation applies both to proofs and to arguments.
Organization. In section 2 we give some preliminaries. The basic construction of zero-knowledge protocols from MPC in the semihonest model is described in section 3, including (in section 3.2) the application to zero-knowledge protocols whose communication complexity is close to the witness length. In section 4, we present our constructions of zero-knowledge protocols from MPC in the malicious model. These are motivated by the application to constant-rate zero-knowledge, presented in section 4.4. We conclude with some final remarks in section 5.
Preliminaries.
In this section we define the notions of zero-knowledge proofs and MPC protocols.
Indistinguishability. A function (·) is negligible if it is asymptotically smaller than the inverse of any polynomial. That is, for every constant c > 0 and all sufficiently large n we have (n) < 1/n c . We say that (·) is overwhelming if 1 − is negligible. Let X ⊆ {0, 1}
* be an infinite set of strings. Two distribution ensembles {A x } x∈X and {B x } x∈X are said to be computationally indistinguishable if, for every efficient nonuniform distinguisher D, there is a negligible function (·) such that for every
Zero-knowledge.
We use the standard notion of zero-knowledge proofs from the literature [24, 20, 16] , adapted to the case where the honest prover should be efficient.
An NP-relation R(x, w) is an efficiently decidable binary relation which is polynomially bounded, in the sense that there is a polynomial p(·) such that if R(x, w) is satisfied, then |w| ≤ p(|x|). We naturally view R as a Boolean function which outputs 0 or 1. Note that any NP-relation R defines an NP-language L = {x : ∃w R(x, w) = 1}.
A zero-knowledge proof protocol for an NP-relation R(x, w) is defined by two probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) interactive algorithms, a prover P and a verifier V . Initially the prover is given an NP statement x and a corresponding witness w, and the verifier is given only the statement x. The prover and the verifier interact using the next-message function defined by their respective algorithms. This function determines the next message to be sent based on the inputs, messages received so far, and the coin tosses of the corresponding party. 
where View V * denotes the view of V * , consisting of its input x, its coin-tosses, and its incoming messages. We will sometimes relax the completeness requirement to allow a negligible error probability. Finally, we will also consider zero-knowledge protocols that have a nonnegligible (typically constant) soundness error . In such cases the soundness error will be specified.
For the sake of simplicity, we do not consider the stronger proof of knowledge property (cf. [16] ) of zero-knowledge protocols. However, our general constructions can be shown to satisfy this property as well.
Using an explicit security parameter. Note that the above standard definition of zero-knowledge proofs implicitly treats the length of the statement x as a security parameter, requiring the advantage of a dishonest party (prover or verifier) to be negligible in |x|. While this is convenient for establishing feasibility results, when studying the concrete efficiency of cryptographic protocols it is useful to introduce a separate security parameter k which is given as an additional input to all algorithms. In such a case, we modify the soundness and zero-knowledge requirements in Definition 2.1 by replacing (|x|) and δ(|x|) by (k) and δ(k), respectively. Furthermore, in the zero-knowledge requirement we restrict the running time of V * and D to be polynomial in k. A zero-knowledge protocol satisfying the latter definition can be turned into a zero-knowledge protocol satisfying the original definition by letting k = |x| c , where c > 0 can be an arbitrarily small constant. 5 Thus, k can be thought of as being asymptotically much smaller than the input length.
Idealized primitives.
When describing our zero-knowledge protocols, it will be convenient to first describe and analyze them in a hybrid model in which idealized versions of primitives such as bit commitment or coin-flipping are available. We then explicitly describe how to instantiate invocations of the ideal primitives (only making a black-box use of a one-way function) in order to get a protocol in the plain model. Such a modular design approach is common in the area of MPC (cf. [7, 17] ). However, since we are dealing with unconditionally sound proofs rather than computationally sound arguments, we cannot apply off-the-shelf composition theorems to deduce the security of the final protocol, and need to argue each case separately.
We note that, despite the lack of general tools for a modular design of zeroknowledge proofs, the analysis of the zero-knowledge protocols we obtain by instantiating the ideal primitives combines in a rather straightforward way the analysis of our protocols in the hybrid model with the analysis of previous zero-knowledge protocols from the literature. Thus, the main contribution of this work may best be viewed within the hybrid model.
Secure multiparty computation.
We use standard definitions of MPC from the literature [7, 16] . Our basic model assumes synchronous communication over secure point-to-point channels. (Some protocols will also rely on other ideal primitives such as OT channels, broadcast primitive, or ideal coin-flipping. These will be explained when they are used.)
Let n be the number of players, which will be denoted by P 1 , . . . , P n . All players share a public input x, and each player P i holds a local private input w i . We consider protocols which securely realize an n-party functionality f , where f maps the inputs (x, w 1 , . . . , w n ) to an n-tuple of outputs. (When only a single output is specified, this output is assumed to be given to all players.) A protocol Π is specified via its next message function. That is, Π(i, x, w i , r i , (m 1 , . . . , m j )) returns the set of n messages (and, possibly, a broadcast message) sent by P i in round j + 1, given the public input x, its local input w i , its random input r i , and the messages m 1 , . . . , m j that it received in the first j rounds. In the case of statistical or computational security, Π receives a security parameter k as an additional input. The output of Π may also indicate that the protocol should terminate, in which case Π returns the local output of P i . The view of P i , denoted by V i , includes w i , r i , and the messages received by P i during the execution of Π. Note that the messages sent by an uncorrupted player P i as well as its local output can be inferred from V i and x by invoking Π. It will be useful to define the following natural notion of consistency between views. 
Proof. The "if" direction follows directly from the definitions. For the "only if" direction, let V 1 , . . . , V n be pairwise consistent views, and let w i , r i be the input and random input reported in view V i . The pairwise consistency of the views implies, by induction on the number of rounds d, that the actual view of every player P i after d rounds when Π is invoked on (x, (w 1 , r 1 ), . . . , (w n , r n )) is the same as the view of P i in the first d rounds reported in V i . It follows that the n views V 1 , . . . , V n are consistent with the full execution of Π, as required.
We consider security of protocols in both the semihonest and the malicious models. In the semihonest model, one may break the security requirements into the following correctness and privacy requirements.
Definition 2.4 (correctness). We say that Π realizes a deterministic n-party functionality f (x, w 1 , . . . , w n ) with perfect (resp., statistical) correctness if for all inputs x, w 1 , . . . , w n the probability that the output of some player is different from the output of f is 0 (resp., negligible in k), where the probability is over the independent choices of the random inputs r 1 , . . . , r n . Definition 2.5 (t-privacy 
In the malicious model, in which corrupted players may behave arbitrarily, security cannot be generally broken into correctness and privacy as above. However, for our purposes we only need the protocols to satisfy a weaker notion of security in the malicious model that is implied by the standard general definition. Specifically, it suffices that Π be t-private as defined above, and moreover it should satisfy the following notion of correctness in the malicious model. Definition 2.6 (t-robustness). We say that Π realizes f with perfect (resp., statistical) t-robustness if it is perfectly (resp., statistically) correct in the presence of a semihonest adversary as in Definition 2.4, and furthermore for any computationally unbounded malicious adversary corrupting a set T of at most t players, and for any inputs (x, w 1 , . . . , w n ), the following robustness property holds. If there is no (w 1 , . . . , w n ) such that f (x, w 1 , . . . , w n ) = 1, then the probability that some uncorrupted player outputs 1 in an execution of Π in which the inputs of the honest players are consistent with (x, w 1 , . . . , w n ) is 0 (resp., is negligible in k).
Finally, we will also consider robustness against an adaptive adversary, which is allowed to dynamically pick the set T of corrupted players based on the views of the players it has seen so far (as long as the total number of corrupted players does not exceed t). Definition 2.6 can be naturally extended to the case of adaptive adversaries. (An instance of such a definition will be formally defined later.) By default, we consider the nonadaptive notion of robustness defined above.
3. Zero-knowledge from MPC in the semihonest model. In this section we present our basic constructions of zero-knowledge protocols, which rely on MPC protocols in the semihonest model.
Let L be a language in NP, and let R(x, w) be a corresponding NP-relation. Let f be the following (n + 1)-argument function (n ≥ 3), corresponding to R:
where ⊕ here denotes bitwise exclusive-or of strings (all of the same length). We view f as an n-party functionality, where the first argument x is a public input known to all n players, w i is a private input of player P i , and the output is received by all players. We will sometimes ignore the public input x, viewing f as an n-argument function specified by x. Let Π f be an n-party protocol which realizes f with perfect correctness and either perfect, statistical, or computational 2-privacy (in the semihonest model). We now describe a zero-knowledge protocol Π R for the NP-relation R. The prover and verifier are both given an input x (an instance of L). The prover is also given a witness w, and they both have a black-box access to the MPC protocol Π f . The zero-knowledge protocol also makes use of a statistically binding commitment protocol Com [44] , which can in turn be based on any one-way function [29, 16] .
We start by describing and analyzing Π R using an idealized implementation of Com, where a string can be committed to by secretly sending it to a trusted third party, and later opened (or "decommitted") by having the committer instruct the trusted party to reveal the committed string. (Note that the committer can refuse to open its commitment, but this fact becomes known to the designated receiver of the committed string.) Alternatively, one can think of a direct physical implementation in which the committed string is sent in a locked box, and decommitment is done by sending a key to unlock the box. We refer to a protocol which employs such an ideal commitment primitive as a protocol in the commitment-hybrid model.
The implementation of Π R in the commitment-hybrid model can be viewed as our main contribution. We will later describe the (standard) modifications to the analysis that are required when instantiating the ideal commitment primitive with an actual cryptographic commitment protocol. The protocol is presented in Figure 3 .1.
Zero-knowledge protocol Π R in the commitment-hybrid model.
1. The prover picks at random w 1 , . . . , w n ∈ {0, 1} m , whose exclusive-or equals the witness w. She emulates "in her head" the execution of Π f on input (x, w 1 , . . . , w n ) (this involves choosing randomness for the n players and running the protocol). Based on this execution, the prover prepares the views V 1 , . . . , V n of the n players; she separately commits to each of these n views. 2. Verifier picks at random distinct player indices i, j ∈ [n] and sends them to the prover. 3. Prover "opens" the commitments corresponding to the two views V i , V j .
Verifier accepts if and only if:
(a) the prover indeed successfully opened the two requested views, (b) the outputs of both P i and P j (which are determined by their views) are 1, and (c) the two opened views are consistent with each other (with respect to x and Π f ; see Definition 2.2). Proof. We separately argue completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge. Completeness. If (x, w) ∈ R and the prover is honest, then, since w 1 ⊕· · ·⊕w n = w and Π f is perfectly correct, the views V 1 , . . . , V n always have output 1. Since these views are produced by an honest execution of the protocol, they are always consistent with each other.
Soundness. Suppose that R(x, w) = 0 for all w. Hence, by the perfect correctness of Π f , for all choices of w 1 , . . . , w n and all choices of random inputs r 1 , . . . , r n , the outputs of all n players in an honest execution of the protocol must be 0. Therefore, considering the n views committed to by the prover in step 1, either in all views the output is 0 or by Lemma 2.3 there exist two views which are inconsistent with respect to x and Π f . In the former case the verifier always rejects, while in the latter case he rejects with probability at least 1/ n 2 , which is his probability of selecting an inconsistent pair i, j.
Zero-knowledge. Let V * be a malicious verifier. We describe a simulator M * for the view of V * which invokes both V * and the MPC simulator Sim as a black-box. We start with the case where Π f is perfectly 2-private. The simulator M * on input x proceeds as follows:
1. Run V * on input x. Let i, j be the pair of indices sent by V * in step 2 of Π R . 2. M * simulates the two views V i , V j , received from the (honest) prover in step 3 of Π R , by picking random w i , w j and running Sim(T = {i, j}, x, (w i , w j ), 1). (Note that the prover's commitments in step 1 are trivial to simulate in the commitment-hybrid model.) We argue that the above simulation is perfect. Fix any (x, w) such that R(x, w) = 1. The randomness of V * chosen by the simulator is distributed identically to the randomness of V * in the actual execution of Π R . It thus suffices to prove that the simulation is perfect, conditioned on every choice of such randomness r V * . Let i, j be the verifier's selections determined by r V * . In the real execution of Π R on (x, w), the inputs w 1 , . . . , w n to Π f (picked by the honest prover) are such that w i and w j are uniform and independent. Thus, conditioned on r V * , the choice of w i , w j made by M * is distributed identically to the choice of w i , w j by the prover in the execution of Π R on inputs (x, w). It remains to show that, conditioned on each possible choice of r V * , w i , w j , the distribution of the views (V i , V j ) received from the prover in step 3 of Π R is identical to the distribution of Sim((i, j), x, (w i , w j ), 1). Indeed, the fact that Sim is a perfect 2-private simulator for Π f guarantees that the latter holds even when further conditioning on every possible choice of w 1 , . . . , w n which is consistent with w i , w j , w.
Finally, if Π f is only statistically or computationally 2-private, the quality of the simulation changes accordingly. (In these cases the simulator receives a security parameter k as an additional input, which it passes to V * and Sim.) The only change to the previous proof is in the final step: when further conditioning on every choice of w 1 , . . . , w n which is consistent with w i , w j , w, the distribution of (V i , V j ) in Π R is now only statistically or computationally close to the output of Sim(k, (i, j), x, (w i , w j ), 1). By a standard averaging argument, this implies that the final output of M * is statistically or computationally close to the view of V * . The ideal commitment primitive in the above protocol can be instantiated with any statistically binding commitment protocol; see [16] for a formal definition. Such a commitment protocol can be based (in a black-box way) on an arbitrary one-way function [29, 44] .
Let Com be a (perfectly binding, computationally hiding) commitment protocol, and let Π Com R denote the protocol obtained from Π R by implementing each invocation of an ideal commitment (or decommitment) in the natural way using a corresponding invocation of Com with security parameter k. Then, we have the following result. . Note that when Com is implemented using a black-box reduction to a one-way function, the implementation of Π Com R (as well as its security reduction) makes only a black-box use of Π f and the one-way function.
Proof. The analysis of Π Com R closely mimics the analysis of the classical GMW zeroknowledge proof for 3-colorability [20] ; we provide details here for self-containment.
The completeness of Π Com R follows from the completeness of Π R and the fact that a decommitment made by an honest prover will always be accepted by an honest verifier.
Soundness. The statistical binding property of Com guarantees that each invocation of Com defines a committed string such that, except with negligible probability over the verifier's coins, only this string can later be decommitted. Thus, the soundness error of Π Com R is bigger than that of Π R by at most a negligible amount (namely, the probability of the prover breaking the binding of any of the commitments).
Zero-knowledge. Similarly to the GMW protocol, a feature of Π Com R that is crucial for the proof of its zero-knowledge property is that the verifier has only a polynomial number of choices he can make in the protocol. As such, the simulator M * works as follows:
1. The simulator makes the following = n 2 k "attempts" until it succeeds. If the simulator fails in all these attempts, it aborts. 2. The simulator first chooses a pair of distinct parties {i, j} and inputs w i , w j at random, and invokes the MPC simulator Sim(k, (i, j), x, (w i , w j ), 1) to obtain the simulated views V i and V j of these parties. For all h / ∈ {i, j}, the simulator prepares random views V h . 3. For each view V i , the simulator runs the commitment protocol with the verifier algorithm. 4. If the verifier responds with the challenge {i, j}, then we say that the attempt succeeds; otherwise the attempt fails, and we start over. If the attempt did succeed, then the simulator opens V i and V j to the verifier and outputs the view of the verifier resulting from the successful interaction. Clearly, each simulation attempt succeeds with independent probability at least 1/n 2 . Therefore the simulator succeeds at least once with probability 1 − 2 −Ω(k) . The computational indistinguishability of the simulation follows from the following standard hybrid argument. (We refer the reader to [20, 16] for a more detailed exposition of this hybrid argument in the context of the GMW zero-knowledge protocol for 3-colorability.)
Hybrids A 1 , . . . , A . Consider a sequence of hybrid experiments in which the simulator is given the witness. In experiment A γ , in the first γ "attempts," instead of applying the MPC simulator, it acts as the honest prover would and prepares all views {V i } according to an honest execution of the MPC protocol. However, it then chooses a pair of parties {i, j} at random, replaces all V h (where h / ∈ {i, j}) with random views, and continues as the simulator does in the last step. (The remaining − γ attempts follow the above simulator.)
Any attacker that can distinguish Hybrid A 1 from the simulator's output would immediately yield a distinguisher for the MPC simulator. Similarly, each A γ is indistinguishable from A γ+1 for the same reason.
Hybrid B. Consider now a Hybrid B which is identical to Hybrid A , except that now all views {V i } remain as generated from the honest execution of the MPC protocol (as the honest prover would). Recall that in Hybrid A , some of these views-the ones that are committed to but never opened-were random views. By indistinguishability of commitments, Hybrid A is indistinguishable from Hybrid B.
The only difference between Hybrid B and the real-world interaction of the prover and verifier in Π Com R is that Hybrid B tries (many times independently) to guess the verifier's choices of i and j ahead of time. By independence, Hybrid B succeeds with probability 1 − 2 −Ω(k) . Therefore, Hybrid B is within statistical distance 2 −Ω(k) from the real-life interaction between the prover and the verifier, and this concludes the proof of the zero-knowledge property.
Since the above simulator makes a black-box use of the malicious verifier, the second part of the theorem is implied by a general sequential composition theorem (cf. [17, 22] suffices to share the witness w among 3 of the n players rather than among all of them. 3. We will later be interested in minimizing the amount of communication in the zero-knowledge protocols. It is instructive to (briefly) analyze the communication complexity of this basic construction. The communication in Π R consists mainly of commitments to the views in Π f . Implementing a statistically binding commitment to a string m of length costs + poly(k) bits of communication, where k is the security parameter. This can be done by first committing to a random seed s ∈ {0, 1} k to a pseudorandom generator G, and then sending m ⊕ G(s). Note that the total length of the views in Π R is equal to O(|w|) plus the communication and randomness complexity of Π f . 4. The description and analysis of Π R can easily be extended to accommodate protocols Π f that use more powerful communication channels. For instance, we can assume that each pair of players has oracle access to an arbitrary 2-party functionality, where both players send inputs to and receive outputs from this functionality. The notion of consistent views can naturally be extended for this case; i.e., the verifier can check that the reported outputs from the oracle are consistent with its inputs. (Note that such oracles do not trivialize the design of Π f because of the 2-privacy requirement.) In particular, we may assume that each pair of players is connected via an OT channel [47, 14] , in which the sender has two inputs s 0 , s 1 and the receiver a selection bit b, and the receiver gets s b . It is also easy to extend Π R to the case where Π f employs broadcast channels, by simply having the prover send to the verifier all broadcast messages. 5. This protocol, as well as most of the following ones, is actually an ArthurMerlin protocol (namely, it requires the verifier to only send public random coins to the prover). Basing zero-knowledge on 1-private MPC. We now describe a modified version of the basic zero-knowledge protocol Π R that can employ any 1-private (rather than 2-private) MPC protocol Π f . In addition to committing to the n views V i , the prover will commit to the messages communicated over each of the n 2 communication channels. The verifier now challenges the prover to open the view V i of a random player P i together with all n − 1 channels incident to P i . The zero-knowledge property follows from the fact that the information revealed to the verifier is implied by the view of the single player P i . The soundness error is at most 1 − 1/n: similarly to Lemma 2.3 one can show that any invalid execution of the protocol must include at least one inconsistency between a local view and an incident channel. This soundness error is better than the 1 − 1/ n 2 error of the basic construction, making the current variant somewhat preferable in terms of efficiency. (We will later show how to obtain more substantial efficiency gains by relying on MPC with stronger robustness properties.) A disadvantage of the current variant over the original protocol Π R is that it cannot support MPC protocols Π f which employ ideal OT channels.
Using MPC protocols from the literature. Most standard MPC protocols for the semihonest model can be used in the above transformation. Perhaps the simplest instance is the 2-private 3-player GMW protocol [21, 17] , implemented using ideal OT channels between each pair of players. One can also employ the 2-private 5-player BGW protocol [3] (or even the 1-private 3-player BGW protocol using the alternative variant of the basic construction), as well as a somewhat simpler protocol from [42] . Finally, there is a large body of work on efficient special-purpose MPC protocols for specific classes of functions, e.g., linear algebra functions. These protocols can now be used to obtain efficient zero-knowledge protocols for the corresponding classes of relations.
3.1.
Coping with statistical correctness. As noted above, our basic construction relies on the MPC protocol's being perfectly correct. We now describe a variant of the basic construction that allows Π f to be statistically correct. 7 The following modification of Π R starts with the prover committing to the inputs w i of the players. Then, the prover and the verifier invoke a coin-flipping procedure whose final outcome, r 1 , . . . , r n , is known only to the prover. Finally, when revealing two views, the verifier is able to verify that the "correct" random inputs were used.
As before, we will mainly focus on describing and analyzing the construction in the commitment-hybrid model, and later describe the modifications required for basing the protocol on a one-way function.
The modified zero-knowledge protocol Π R proceeds, in the commitment-hybrid model, as described in Figure 3 Proof. Completeness, as before, is easy to verify: the probability of the verifier rejecting in a correct interaction with an honest prover is precisely the error probability of Π f . (Perfect completeness can be easily achieved by letting the prover send w if her invocation of Π f produces an incorrect output; since this only happens with negligible probability, the zero-knowledge property will not be affected.) Soundness. Suppose that x is such that R(x, w) = 0 for all w. We show that the verifier rejects with at least 1/ n 2 − δ(k) probability for some negligible δ(·). Since we are considering soundness, we can assume, without loss of generality, that the prover always finishes the protocol and appropriately opens all of the committed values it is requested to open. (Failing to open a commitment automatically makes the verifier reject.) That is, any prover that occasionally fails to open its commitments or fails to finish the protocol can be trivially converted into a prover that always opens its commitments and finishes the protocol, and has at least as high a probability of getting the verifier to accept. Since the inputs w i for Π f as well as the shares of the random inputs r P i are committed to in step 1, it is guaranteed that the effective random inputs r i = r P i ⊕ r V i determined in step 2 are independent of the effective inputs w i . (Indeed, the verifier selects r V i uniformly and independently at random once the prover is already committed to r P i .) We can now distinguish between the following cases:
• The inputs w i and the random inputs r i lead some player in an honest execution of Π f to an (incorrect) output of 1. By the statistical correctness of Π f and the independence of r i from w i , this event occurs with negligible probability.
• Otherwise (namely, w i , r i lead all players to output 0); we distinguish between two subcases: -The views V i committed to in step 3 are obtained by honestly running Π f with the inputs w i and the random inputs r i . In this case, all views V i imply an output of 0, and the verifier always rejects. -Otherwise, either the input in some view V i is different from the string w i determined in step 1, or the random input in some V i is different from the r i determined in step 2, or there is a pair of views V i , V j that are not consistent with respect to x and Π f . (If neither of these types of inconsistencies occurs, then we must be in the first subcase.) Either way, an inconsistency will be detected with at least 1/ n 2 probability. Overall, the verifier's rejection probability is at least 1/ n 2 − δ(k), where δ is the error probability of Π f . Note that the statistical correctness of Π f not only relies on the random inputs r i being uniformly distributed, but also assumes that they are chosen independently of the inputs x, w i . Hence, it is essential that the prover first commit to w 1 , . . . , w n (as done in step 1).
Zero-knowledge. The zero-knowledge property is proved similarly to the basic case. Intuitively, the hiding property of the prover's commitments guarantees that the verifier cannot influence the randomness used when invoking Π f , nor can it learn anything about the random inputs of players other than P i , P j . These views, as before, can be simulated by using the simulator Sim guaranteed by the 2-privacy of Π f .
The simulator M * of a dishonest verifier V * proceeds on input (k, x) as follows:
n be the strings sent by V * in step 2, and i, j be the pair of indices sent in step 4. (As before, the prover's commitments are trivial to simulate in the commitment-hybrid model.) 2. Pick random w i , w j and run Sim(k, {i, j}, x, (w i , w j ), 1) to simulate the pair of views (V i , V j ). Let r i , r j be the pair of random inputs contained in the simulated views. 3. Use the above w i , w j , V i , V j and r
to simulate the prover's decommitments in step 5. The correctness of M * is argued similarly to the previous case of a perfectly correct Π f . The only difference is that now the random inputs r i used by the prover for running Π f are generated jointly with V * . But since the prover's contributions r P i are independent of the verifier's contributions r V * i , the views (V i , V j ) in Π R are indistinguishable from the output of Sim(k, {i, j}, x, (w i , w j ), 1) even when conditioning on the randomness of V * . We turn to the question of implementing Π R using a statistically binding commitment protocol Com. Unlike the basic construction, here the protocol obtained by naturally substituting Com for every invocation of an ideal commitment is not known to be zero-knowledge. The problem is that the randomness picked by a dishonest verifier in step 2 can depend on the messages received from the prover in step 1. This turns out to be problematic in the context of efficient simulation.
We solve this problem in a standard way, by replacing step 2 by a joint generation of r V i using a simulatable coin-flipping protocol involving both the prover and the verifier. For this purpose, one can use a sequential repetition of Blum's coin-flipping protocol [4] . Specifically, to generate a random string r V i of length m, the prover and the verifier interact in m phases. In each phase the prover uses Com to commit to a random bit μ P , the verifier sends a random bit μ V , and the prover opens μ P . (If the prover fails to open μ P , the verifier rejects.) The random bit resulting from this phase is taken to be μ V ⊕ μ P .
We describe this modified version, which (with a slight abuse of notation) we denote by Π Proof. Completeness follows exactly as in protocol Π R . Soundness also follows almost exactly as in protocol Π R , the only difference being that the uniformity and independence of the r i values is guaranteed by the honest verifier's choice of μ V i in the coin-flipping subprotocol.
Zero-knowledge. For arguing zero-knowledge, we will make use of the following standard lemma regarding the coin-flipping protocol Π coin carried out in step 2 of our protocol (see, e.g., [17, Chapter 7] 1. The simulator makes the following = n 2 k "attempts" until it succeeds. If the simulator fails in all these attempts, it aborts. 2. The simulator first chooses a pair of distinct parties {i, j} and inputs w i , w j at random, and invokes the MPC simulator Sim(k, (i, j), x, (w i , w j ), 1) to obtain the simulated views V i and V j of these parties. Let r i , r j be the pair of random inputs contained in the simulated views. For all h / ∈ {i, j}, the simulator prepares random views V h . 3. The simulator acts as the honest prover would in step 1. 4. For step 2, the simulator invokes S coin guaranteed by Lemma 3.5 repeatedly and uses it to guarantee that r
j , by making a suitable requirement on each of the ψ P ⊕ ψ V . 5. For each view V i , the simulator runs the commitment protocol with the verifier algorithm. 6. If the verifier responds with the challenge {i, j}, then we say that the attempt succeeds; otherwise the attempt fails, and we start over. If the attempt did succeed, then the simulator opens V i and V j to the verifier and outputs the view of the verifier resulting from the successful interaction. The correctness of this simulator follows the same argument as the correctness of the simulator of the basic protocol (using the same sequence of hybrids as in the proof of Theorem 3.2), additionally using the simulator guarantee provided by Lemma 3.5.
Application: Approaching the witness length.
In this section, we present zero-knowledge protocols whose communication complexity is m · poly(k) · polylog(s), where m is the witness length, k is a cryptographic security parameter, and s is the size of the witness verification circuit C x (w) verifying R(x, ·). This holds whenever C x has constant depth.
The zero-knowledge protocols rely on an MPC protocol for constant-depth circuits from [1] . The basic version of this protocol combines the polynomial representation techniques of Razborov [49] and Smolensky [53] with the MPC protocol of BGW [3] . (The protocol from [1] includes some additional optimizations that are not important for our crude complexity analysis.) In the appendix we describe a noninteractive version of the above protocol which achieves a similar communication complexity.
4. Zero-knowledge from MPC in the malicious model. In this section, we aim at getting zero-knowledge protocols with negligible soundness error 2 −k while avoiding the naive repetition that carries a multiplicative overhead of Ω(k) in the complexity. We do this by strengthening the security requirement from the underlying MPC protocol Π f to t-security in the malicious model. (This should be contrasted with 2-privacy or 1-privacy in the semihonest model used in the previous section.) In fact, we only need the MPC protocol to be t-private in the semihonest model and (perfectly or statistically) t-robust in the malicious model, as defined in Definition 2.6.
We start by assuming that Π f is perfectly t-robust. We will pick our parameters such that t is a constant multiple of the soundness parameter k and n is a constant multiple of t. The zero-knowledge protocol in this case is identical to the protocol Π R described in the basic construction (Figure 3.1) , except that the verifier asks the prover to open t randomly selected views and checks for their consistency. The protocol Π R,t is formally described in Figure 4 .1.
Zero-knowledge protocol Π R,t in the commitment-hybrid model.
1. Prover picks at random w 1 , . . . , w n ∈ {0, 1} m whose exclusive-or equals the witness w. She emulates the execution of Π f on input (x, w 1 , . . . , w n ). Based on this execution, the prover prepares the views V 1 , . . . , V n of the n players; she separately commits to each of these n views. views V 1 , . . . , V n committed to by the prover. If all inconsistencies between these views can be resolved by eliminating at most t views (in other words, if there are n − t views which are consistent with each other), then the protocol execution committed to via V 1 , . . . , V n could be realized by an adversary corrupting at most t players. (We do not require the t excluded views to be consistent with the other n − t views; the excluded views can be thought of as being reported by the adversary.) By the perfect t-robustness of Π f , in such an execution on an input x ∈ L all uncorrupted players must output 0. This implies that there are at least n − t committed views V i such that the output of P i is 0. Since t is a constant fraction of n, the verifier will open at least one of these views (and therefore reject) except with negligible probability in n. On the other hand, if resolving all inconsistencies requires eliminating more than t views, then the t opened views will reveal to the verifier, with overwhelming probability, at least one inconsistency.
To formally argue the soundness, consider the following inconsistency graph G, defined based on the n committed views V 1 , . . . , V n . The graph G has n vertices (corresponding to the n views), and there is an edge (i, j) in G if the views V i , V j are inconsistent (with respect to Π f and x). That is, the incoming messages from P j in the view V i are different from the outgoing messages to P i implicit in V j , or vice versa. We analyze the soundness according to two cases, showing that the verifier rejects any x / ∈ L with overwhelming probability in both cases. Case 1. There exists in G a vertex cover set B of size at most t. We argue that in this case, the output in all views V i , for i / ∈ B, must be 0. (The intuition is that a "small" vertex cover can "explain" all the inconsistencies among the views.) To see this, consider an execution of the protocol Π f where the adversary corrupts the set of players B and behaves in a way that the views of any player P j , for j / ∈ B, is V j . Such an execution is obtained by choosing all the messages from P i ∈ B to P j / ∈ B as in the view V j ; since B is a vertex cover, every pair of views V i , V j with i, j ∈B is not connected in the graph G and hence consistent. Finally, by the perfect t-robustness of Π f , such a corruption should not influence the output of the honest players, which must be 0. Hence, if in all views V j with j / ∈ B the output is 0, it suffices that the verifier, among his t choices, will pick at least one player not in B. By the choice of parameters, the probability that this does not happen is at most (t/n)
(Here and in the following we denote by min-VC(G) the size of a minimum vertex cover of G.) We would like to argue that in such a graph, a random choice of a constant fraction of the vertices will hit an edge with overwhelming probability. For this we use the well-known connection between the size of a minimum vertex cover and the size of a maximum matching. (The advantage of considering a matching is that we get independence between the edges.) In more detail, the graph G must have a matching of size > t/2 (otherwise, if the maximum matching contains ≤ t/2 edges, the vertices of this matching form a vertex cover of size ≤ t). If the verifier picks at least one edge of G, he will reject. The probability that the t vertices (views) that the verifier picks miss all the edges of G is smaller than the probability that he misses all edges of the matching, which is again at most 2 −Ω(t) = 2 −Ω(k) . (Indeed, suppose that the first t/2 vertices i j1 , i j t/2 do not hit an edge of the matching; then their t/2 matching neighbors will have Ω(t/n) = Ω(1) probability of being hit by each subsequent vertex i j .)
The proof of Theorem 4.1 illustrates why we cannot rely on t-privacy alone and need the MPC protocol to be t-robust against a malicious adversary. Indeed, in a t-private protocol it may be the case that a single malicious player P i causes all honest players to have an incorrect output by simply sending incorrect messages. This corresponds to an inconsistency graph G in which P i alone forms a vertex cover. In such a case the verifier will detect an inconsistency only if P i is randomly picked, which happens with constant probability.
We will delay addressing how to realize the commitments in the above protocol until we reach the final protocol of this section (see below).
Changing the MPC model.
A final change that we will need in order to eliminate the soundness amplification overhead of the basic construction is to avoid the secret sharing of w among the n players. Instead, we will use an MPC protocol Π f for the following modified functionality f . The functionality takes the entire input w from a special player I, called an "input client" (following the terminology of [13] ), and outputs R(x, w) to all n players P i . (The NP statement x, as before, is known to all players, but no player other than I has a private input.) The protocol Π f can be assumed to be secure in the malicious model against an adversary who may corrupt I and at most t players P i . As before, we only need the protocol to satisfy the t-privacy and (perfect) t-robustness requirements from Definitions 2.5 and 2.6, except that trobustness allows the adversary to corrupt I in addition to at most t players P i . We note that the MPC protocol from [13] which we will use later is already presented in this "input clients" framework.
The zero-knowledge protocol, denoted Π R,I,t , proceeds in this case in the same way as the protocol Π R,t from Figure 4 .1, except for the following changes: (1) instead of secret-sharing w between n players, w is directly used by the prover as an input to I when invoking Π f ; (2) the verifier asks to see the views of t randomly selected players P i (excluding the input client I) and checks that they all output 1 and are consistent with each other. The view of I cannot be opened (and hence need not be committed), as this would reveal w.
Theorem 4.2. Let f be the following functionality for an input client I and n players P 1 , . . . , P n . Given a public input x and a private input w received from I, the functionality delivers R(x, w) to all players P i . Suppose that Π f realizes f with perfect t-robustness (in the malicious model) and perfect, statistical, or computational t-privacy (in the semihonest model), where t = Ω(k) and n = ct for some constant c > 1. Then Π R,I,t , described above, is a zero-knowledge proof protocol for the NPrelation R in the commitment-hybrid model, with soundness error 2 −Ω(k) . Proof. The completeness and zero-knowledge properties are argued in essentially the same way as for Π R,t . (For the zero-knowledge property, the MPC simulator does not need to feed the simulated players P i with inputs w i , since these players now have no private inputs.)
The soundness proof needs to be slightly modified to account for the different MPC network and zero-knowledge protocol. Specifically, the difference from the proof of Theorem 4.1 is that the view of one player, I, is never opened. However, this is already accounted for by the fact that the modified definition of t-robustness allows I along with up to t additional players to be corrupted. For completeness, we sketch the modified argument for soundness in the current, slightly modified MPC model.
Suppose that x is a false statement, and consider the inconsistency graph G (on the n vertices P 1 , . . . , P n ) defined by the views committed to by a malicious prover. We distinguish between the following two cases:
1. min-VC(G) ≤ t. Similarly to Case 1 of the previous analysis, the committed views can be explained by an execution of the protocol in which I and at most t players P i are corrupted. By perfect t-robustness, in such an execution all remaining n − t players should output 0, which will be detected by the verifier except with 2 −Ω(k) probability. 2. min-VC(G) > t. Similarly to Case 2 of the previous analysis, the graph must have a minimal matching of size bigger than t/2. Thus, an inconsistency between a pair of players P i , P j will be detected except with 2
probability.
Coping with statistical robustness.
In this section we describe a variant of the previous protocol from section 4.1 that applies to the case where Π f is only statistically robust. This is motivated by the application to constant-rate zeroknowledge, which is described in section 4.4.
If Π f is only statistically t-robust, a malicious adversary corrupting I and at most t players P i can have a negligible probability of cheating, namely making some players output 1 when x is a false statement. Interestingly, in this case the coin-flipping-based modification of the basic protocol presented in section 3.1 does not suffice to achieve the desired level of soundness. This is because the prover, while being committed to random inputs on which she has no control, is allowed to generate the views V 1 , . . . , V n after she is given the random inputs of all players. (This should be contrasted with real executions of Π f , in which the adversary knows the randomness only of corrupted players.) In such a case, even a single malicious player may suffice for making all outputs incorrect with high probability. If this particular player is not picked by the verifier, no inconsistency is revealed, but still the outputs may be incorrect.
To get around this difficulty, it is convenient to separate the random inputs r i that are used for the privacy of the protocol from those that are used to ensure its robustness. Below we describe a construction that works for protocols that are broken into two phases, Phase 1 and Phase 2, where following Phase 1, the players obtain a public random string r of length that is used in Phase 2. This can be generalized to protocols that have more than two phases; however, the crucial point is that each string r generated in the middle of the protocol must be unpredictable during previous phases. The robustness of the two-phase protocol should hold also with respect to an adaptive adversary that may choose (some of) the t corrupted players after seeing the random string r. More precisely, we make the following adaptive t-robustness requirement. This adaptive robustness property, which will be satisfied by the concrete MPC protocol we will employ in section 4.4, is crucial for the soundness analysis to go through.
The zero-knowledge protocol Π R,I,t obtained from such a two-phase MPC protocol Π f is described in Figure 4 .2. For convenience, we assume here that the prover and the verifier have access not only to an ideal commitment but also to an ideal coinflipping oracle. However, the latter oracle can be easily implemented in our setting based on the former. Proof. The completeness and zero-knowledge properties are argued as before. We argue soundness by assigning to any cheating prover's strategy in the zero-knowledge protocol a corresponding adversarial strategy in the MPC protocol that generates the same views. Such a simulation is possible only when the zero-knowledge prover does Zero-knowledge protocol Π R,I,t in the commitment and coin-flipping hybrid model.
1. Prover picks a random input r I for I and a random input r i for every player P i . She computes the views of the players up to the end of Phase 1, denoted by (V 1 1 , . . . , V 1 n ), and commits to all of them. Any messages broadcasted in this phase of the MPC protocol are directly sent from P to V . 2. The prover and the verifier invoke a coin-flipping oracle to generate a random challenge string r of length . 3. Prover continues to run the protocol in her head, using the string r generated in the previous step, and produces the views (V not create too many inconsistent views; however, when she does, the zero-knowledge verifier will detect an inconsistency and reject with overwhelming probability. We now formalize this argument. Fix a false statement x. Let P * be a (deterministic, computationally unbounded) prover strategy in the zero-knowledge protocol on input x. Denote by V n which P * commits to in step 3 in response to the random challenge r. Finally let G P * (r) be the inconsistency graph defined by the complete set of views V P * (r) = (V 1 P * , V 2 P * (r)). We define a corresponding (deterministic, computationally unbounded) MPC adversary A * that will attempt to generate the same views as P * by corrupting I and at most t players P i in the MPC protocol. (Recall that we allow the MPC adversary to determine the random input r i of all players, even ones it does not corrupt. However, it cannot predict the random challenge r generated between the two phases.)
The MPC adversary A * starts by considering the inconsistency graph G inputs r I , r 1 , . . . , r n as specified in V 1 P * . Now A * interacts with Phase 1 of the MPC protocol, sending messages on behalf of corrupted players that make the views of all uncorrupted players consistent with V 1 P * . (This is possible by the assumption that T 1 forms a vertex cover.) Next, A * obtains the random challenge r. The r it receives defines the final inconsistency graph G P * (r). Again, if the graph does not have a vertex cover T 2 of size t/2, A * gives up. Otherwise, it corrupts all uncorrupted players in T 2 and interacts with Phase 2 of the MPC protocol. (Note that overall at most t players were corrupted, so this is indeed an admissible adaptive corruption strategy for A * .) As before, A * sends messages on behalf of corrupted players that make the final views of all uncorrupted players consistent with V P * (r). The final MPC views V A * (r) are defined as the actual views of uncorrupted players, together with the views appearing in V P * (r) for corrupted players.
Lemma 4.5. For every r, if G P * (r) has a vertex cover of size at most t/2, then V A * (r) = V P * (r).
Proof. Since G 1 P * is a subgraph of G P * (r), the assumption implies that both T 1 and T 2 as required exist, and thus A * doesn't give up. The lemma follows by noting that any message sent to an uncorrupted player throughout the two phases of the protocol is consistent with V P * (r).
The following lemma is proved similarly to the soundness analysis in the case of perfect robustness.
Lemma 4.6. For every r such that G P * (r) does not have a vertex cover of size t/2, the zero-knowledge verifier rejects except with probability 2 −Ω(k) . We are now ready to prove the desired 2 −Ω(k) + δ(k) bound on the soundness error of the zero-knowledge protocol. We consider three events that cover all possible choices of r:
1. r makes A * break the t-robustness of Π f . By the assumption on Π f , this event occurs with at most δ(k) probability. 2. The previous event does not occur, and moreover G P * (r) has a vertex cover of size at most t/2. By Lemma 4.5, there are at least n−t views in V P * (r) whose output is 0. Thus, conditioned on this event, the verifier will open at least one of these views, and consequently reject, except with 2 −Ω(k) probability. 3. G P * (r) does not have a vertex cover of size at most t/2. By Lemma 4.6, conditioned on this event, the verifier accepts with probability at most 2 −Ω(k) . Overall, the verifier's acceptance probability is at most 2 −Ω(k) + δ(k), as required. This concludes the proof of Theorem 4.4. We note that the gap between the size t/2 of the vertex cover and the MPC corruption threshold t is related to the "on-line" nature of adaptive corruptions. In the end of Phase 1, the MPC adversary cannot predict the set of players that will serve as a minimal vertex cover in the final graph.
4.3.
Implementing the commitment and coin-flipping. The proofs of zeroknowledge given for our previous protocols in the plain model all relied on the verifier making one of only a polynomial number of choices for his challenge about which views he will see. Here, the choices that the verifier makes are from a much larger set and therefore cannot simply be guessed by the zero-knowledge simulator. Instead, we employ the standard technique (cf. [18, 2, 51, 46] ) of having a "preamble" in which the verifier commits in advance to his choices using a statistically hiding commitment scheme Com SH so as to preserve soundness. In this preamble the verifier also needs to "prove knowledge" of his choices.
Using the recent result of [27] , the statistically hiding commitment scheme Com SH can be based on any one-way function. As in previous protocols, we will also make use of a standard statistically binding commitment scheme Com SB .
The resulting protocol is described in Figure 4 .3. , and commits to all of them using Com SB . Any messages broadcast in this phase of the MPC protocol are directly sent from P to V . 4. The prover and the verifier invoke the following coin-flipping protocol Π coin to generate a random challenge string r of length : For i = 1 to , (a) Prover commits using Com SB to a randomly chosen bit ψ P . (b) Verifier sends a randomly chosen bit ψ V to the prover. (c) Prover opens her commitment to ψ P . At this point, we define the ith bit of r, denoted r i , to be ψ V ⊕ ψ P . 5. Prover continues to run the protocol in her head, using the string r generated above, and produces a vector (V requested commitments, the opened views are all consistent (given the public values x, r and the broadcast messages sent by the prover), and the output in all these views is 1. Proof. We note that the proof of completeness and soundness is essentially the same as in the proof of Theorem 4.4, since steps 1 and 2 keep the verifier's selections statistically hidden.
We need only provide a proof of the zero-knowledge property. The simulator M * of a dishonest (and, without loss of generality, deterministic) verifier V * on input (k, x) is described below. The correctness of the simulation is straightforward.
1. The simulator acts as the honest prover in step 1 and receives the verifier's commitments according to the Com SH protocol. 2. In step 2, for each i, the simulator proceeds as follows: . Regardless of whether it received a valid response, the simulator rewinds the state of the verifier back to σ i and continues. 3. If the simulator was never able to obtain both τ i,0 and τ i,1 for any i, then the simulator aborts and outputs ⊥. Note that if the simulator aborts, then the probability of the verifier completing step 2 of the protocol conditioned on its step 1 messages is 2 −k , and thus the probability of the simulator aborting is negligible.
8 Otherwise, the simulator continues. 4. The simulator now invokes the MPC simulator Sim, providing Sim with the list of indices {i j } extracted from the verifier above. In turn, Sim provides the simulator with the simulated views {V ij } of these parties, together with any broadcasted messages during the MPC protocol and the random challenge r. For all h / ∈ {i j }, the simulator prepares random views V h . Each of these views V i is split into two parts V 6. For step 4, the simulator invokes S coin as guaranteed by the coin-flipping lemma repeatedly, and uses it to guarantee that each bit of r is set to be the random challenge specified by the MPC simulator above. 7. For step 5, the simulator commits to all the Phase 2 views (V 2 1 , . . . , V 2 n ) and sends all the broadcasted messages of Phase 2. 8. For step 6, the simulator acts as the honest prover would and verifies that all commitments that are opened by the verifier are opened in a manner consistent with the extraction above. If not, then the simulator aborts. Note that if this kind of simulator abort happens with noticeable probability, it can directly be used to break 9 the computational binding property of the commitment scheme Com SH . 9. For step 7, the simulator opens the 2t commitments {V 
4.4.
Application: "Constant-rate" zero-knowledge proofs. In this section, we describe the construction of zero-knowledge protocols whose communication complexity is linear in the circuit size s, by applying the general construction from section 4.2 on top of a variant of the MPC protocol from [13] .
The protocol from [13] conforms to the requirements of a two-phase protocol, as defined in section 4.2, with t = Ω(n) and with a random challenge r of size = poly(k, log s). Thus, the general construction from section 4.2 can be applied. In fact, Phase 2 can take the degenerate form of only involving broadcast messages. Thus, in step 3 of the general construction the prover can send these messages to the verifier instead of committing.
The communication complexity of the MPC protocol from [13] in the case where the inputs originate from a constant number of clients is poly(k) · log n · s + poly(k, n, log s). 10 We now describe how to reduce this complexity to O(s) + poly(k, n, log s) for the type of functionalities f required by our application.
The source of the multiplicative poly(k) overhead in [13] is the need to deal with circuits of an arbitrary depth. However, in the context of proof verification, one may assume without loss of generality that the witness is of size s (and includes the intermediate values in the computation of C(w) in addition to w itself) and that R has s output bits, each verifying the consistency of the output of one gate of C with its two inputs. (An output of 1 s of the augmented R is interpreted as an output of 1 of the original R; every other output of the augmented R is interpreted as 0.)
Note that each of the s output bits of R depends on only three of the s input bits. In this setting the total communication complexity of the protocol from [13] is only O(log n · s) + poly(k, n, log s). Here the O(log n) multiplicative overhead results from the use of Shamir's secret-sharing [52] (more precisely, the variant of this secretsharing due to Franklin and Yung [15] ), which requires the field size to be larger than the number of players. As a final optimization, one can implement the secret-sharing of [15] over fields of constant size by basing the secret-sharing on algebraic-geometric codes [9] . This results in an additional fractional decrease in the security threshold, which does not affect the asymptotic complexity of the zero-knowledge protocol.
The following lemma summarizes the properties of the MPC protocol we use to obtain constant-rate zero-knowledge protocols.
Lemma 4.8 (see [13, 9] ). Let f be a functionality which takes its input w from an input client I and delivers its output f (w) to n players P 1 , . . . , P n . Suppose that f can be computed by a circuit of size s with bounded fan-in and constant depth. Then, f can be realized by a perfectly t-private and adaptively statistically t-robust two-phase MPC protocol Π f with t = Ω(n) and the following efficiency features:
• Phase 1 involves a total of O(s) + poly(k, n, log s) bits sent from I to the n players P i .
• The random challenge r between the two phases is of length poly(k, n, log s).
• Proof. Combining Lemma 4.8 and Theorem 4.4 directly yields a protocol as required in the commitment-hybrid model. To derive the desired result in the plain model from Theorem 4.7, we need to base efficient instantiations of the commitment protocols invoked by Π Com R,I,t on an arbitrary one-way function. The statistically hiding commitment protocol Com SH is applied only to strings of total length poly(k, log s) and therefore does not form an efficiency bottleneck. It thus suffices to present a statistically binding commitment protocol Com in which commitment and decommitment on a message of length can be done with communication complexity O( ) + poly(k). Such a commitment protocol Com can be obtained in a standard way from an arbitrary statistically binding commitment protocol Com and a pseudorandom generator G (hence also from any one-way function [29, 44] ): to commit to a message m, the sender in Com applies Com to a random seed r ∈ {0, 1} k and then sends m ⊕ G(r).
Concluding remarks.
This work establishes a new general connection between zero-knowledge proofs and MPC. In particular, we have demonstrated that MPC protocols for the case of an honest majority can serve as a useful building block in the design of efficient and conceptually simple zero-knowledge proofs, including the first construction of "constant-rate" zero-knowledge proofs for all of NP. The idea of making a general use of MPC with honest majority in the context of secure two-party computation and MPC with no honest majority is likely to find additional applications beyond those considered in this work. Evidence in this direction was recently given in [28, 33] .
We conclude by noting that while MPC is a conceptually attractive and very well studied notion, it is not necessarily the most general abstraction of the combinatorial object required by our zero-knowledge protocols. One may view the MPC component in these protocols as implementing a zero-knowledge variant of probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs) over large alphabets. Other kinds of proof systems-interactive PCPs [35] and interactive proofs with quasi-linear-time verifiers [23] -were recently exploited to construct efficient zero-knowledge protocols, and particularly to improve over the results of section 3.2. It would be interesting to obtain a better understanding of the relations between these proof systems, zero-knowledge proofs, and MPC.
Appendix. Approaching the witness length in the noninteractive setting. In this section we describe a realization of the protocol from section 3.2 in a model of noninteractive zero-knowledge (NIZK) with preprocessing, previously considered in [34] and [40] .
In the description below, it is assumed that the preprocessing phase is run by a trusted dealer who sends randomized messages to the prover and the verifier (before the input x is available) and then disappears.
A first idea for obtaining a noninteractive protocol is to replace the (interactive) commit-and-challenge approach by the following implementation of noninteractive 2-out-of-n OT. In the preprocessing step, the dealer sends to the prover n random encryption keys and to the verifier a random subset of two of these keys (whose identity is unknown to the prover). In the online phase, the prover generates n views as in the interactive protocol and sends the encryption of each view V i using the corresponding key. The verifier learns a random pair of views and, as in the basic protocol, verifies their consistency. (This can be repeated in parallel to amplify soundness.)
The statistical correctness of the underlying MPC protocol Π poses an additional difficulty. Picking the randomness to be used in the protocol Π during the preprocessing step is problematic because the prover may choose for some x / ∈ L its input w after getting to see this randomness. Here, however, we can use a simple modification of [1] that gives a family of protocols Π ρ , ρ ∈ {0, 1} mk·polylog(s) , such that each Π ρ has roughly the same complexity as Π, and a random protocol from this family is perfectly correct and private except with 2 −k probability over the choice of ρ. The protocol can now proceed as in the perfect case, except that a random ρ is given to both the prover and the verifier during the preprocessing step, and ρ is used to define a protocol Π ρ to be used in the proof. (If the choice of x can depend on ρ, the length of ρ should be increased roughly by |x|.) Fact A.1 (modified from [1] ). Let C be a constant-depth circuit, as in Fact 3.6. Then there exists a family of (2, n)-secure MPC protocols {Π ρ } ρ∈{0,1} mk·polylog(s) , with parameters n, m as in Fact 3.6 and communication complexity and randomness complexity of m · polylog(s). Moreover, with overwhelming probability over the choice of ρ, the protocol Π ρ computes C(·) with perfect correctness and privacy.
(Using the terminology and notation of [1] , we need to get an RPC (randomizing polynomials collection) p ρ (x, r) with public randomness ρ of size mk · polylog(s) that, with overwhelming probability over the choice of ρ, is perfectly correct. This can be achieved by repeating the basic RPC construction from [1] O(mk) times, reducing the error probability on any fixed input w ∈ {0, 1} m to 2 −km , and then applying efficient degree-3 randomizing polynomials for a threshold function on the output. By a union bound argument, an overwhelming fraction of the ρ will be good for all inputs w.)
Given such a family Π ρ , the zero-knowledge protocol Π R in the noninteractive model proceeds as follows:
1. (Preprocessing phase) The trusted dealer chooses a random protocol index ρ and sends it to both the prover and the verifier. It also picks n random symmetric encryption keys K 1 , . . . , K n that it sends to the prover, and it picks at random two distinct indices i, j ∈ [n] and sends to the verifier (i, j, K i , K j ).
(Proof )
The prover picks at random w 1 , . . . , w n ∈ {0, 1} m such that w 1 ⊕· · ·⊕ w n = w, as well as randomness r 1 , . . . , r n for Π ρ . She emulates the execution of Π ρ on inputs (x, w 1 , . . . , w n ) and random inputs r 1 , . . . , r n . Based on this execution, the prover prepares the views V 1 , . . . , V n of the n players in Π ρ . She separately encrypts each view V i using the key K i given to it in the preprocessing phase, and sends e 1 = Encrypt (V 1 , K 1 ) , . . . , e n = Encrypt(V n , K n ) to the verifier. 3. (Verification) Verifier decrypts V i , V j using e i , e j and the keys K i , K j he got in the preprocessing phase, and accepts if and only if the output of both P i and P j (as follows from their views) is 1 and the two views are consistent (according to Π ρ ). Due to its similarity to our previous constructions, we only sketch the properties of the protocol. The completeness of the protocol is easily verifiable. For the soundness, since we assume that the preprocessing phase is carried out by a trusted party, then i, j are completely hidden from the prover. If the randomly chosen protocol Π ρ is not perfectly correct, then protocol Π R provides no guarantees; this, however, happens with negligible probability. Otherwise (i.e., Π ρ is perfectly correct), if the views are not all consistent, then this is detected with probability at least 1/n 2 , and if the views are consistent, then, by the perfect correctness, the output is always correct (i.e., 0). Regarding zero-knowledge, by the semantic security of Encrypt the verifier cannot distinguish between the message actually sent by the prover and a message which contains an encryption of the actual views V i , V j for which it has the encryption keys along with encryptions of random values for the remaining n − 2 views. Thus, this message can be simulated by using the MPC simulator to generate the views V i , V j .
The soundness of the above protocol relies on the assumption that the input x is picked independently of ρ. (Otherwise it is not guaranteed that a random Π ρ will be perfectly correct with high probability.) An adaptive choice of x can be handled by increasing the length of ρ (roughly by |x| or, more generally, the description size of x).
